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20 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

that the lessee should drill for oil on the premises or tear down
valuable buildings. Could not tlie lessor bring an action at law for
waste? Clearly he could not if the lessee has a2 0 fee; yet it is
believed that in a lease of this kind he could do so.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Stark v.
Mansfield,2' while not directly in point, would seem to throw some
light on the effect of a statute which gives a lease an important
attribute of a fee. In that case a lease for one hundred years, renewable forever, was involved and the question was whether the lessor
had a reversion. The court held he had, although a statute provided
that leases for a term one hundred years or more, so long as fifty
years remain unexpired, should be regarded as an estate in fee
simple as to everything concerning its descent. While that statute
differs widely from the Ohio statute, it seems clear that Mr. Justice
Holmes did not consider that making a lease descend as a fee, necessarily transformed it into such an estate.
What makes the interpretation of these statutes by the Ohio
court more remarkable is that three years before, in the case of
Rawson v. Brown,2 2 the court had considered at length this same
group of statutes and had concluded that they fell short of making
in ninety-nine year leases, renewable forever, a.
the lessee's interest
28
freehold estate.
Ohio State University.
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20. Clearly, so long as this is a mere term of years, the lessee should be
liable at law for waste. In the Maryland case of Crowe v. Wilson (1886)
65 Md. 479, 5 Atl. 427, however, the court, while recognizing the chattel
character of ninety-nine year leases renewable forever, seemed to feel that the
liability of the lessee should not be exactly the same as in the case of an

ordinary term; an 'injunction restraining waste was allowed in that case.
21. (1901) 178 Mass. 76, 59 N. E. 643. 'The court said: "The earlier

part of the section provides that when land is demised for a term of one
hundred years or more, the term, so long as fifty years of it remain unex-

pired, shall be regarded as an estate in fee simple as to everything concern-

ing its descent and various other incidents not affecting this case. The
section then ends with the words, 'and whoever holds as lessee or assignee
under such a lease shall, so long as fifty years of the term are unexpired, be

regarded as a freeholder, for all purposes.' But this does not give the lessee
a fee, it simply gives to his interest a dignity and quality equal to a life
estate. It is not intended to destroy or impair the reversion of the lessor or
to make it in any degree less an estate than it was before." In another
part of the opinion the court seemed to base its conclusion in part on
absence of words of inheritance in the lease, but that circumstance, it would

seem, should not affect the situation so far as the point in question is concerned.
22. (1922) 104 Ohio St. 537, 136 N. E. 209.
23. That case involved the power of a court to partition the lessor's
interest. The court held that it could be done because the lessor was seized

of a present estate of freehold. In Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, supra,

the opinion in Rawson v. Brown is not referred to. It is submitted that the
two cases are reconcilable only on the theory that Rawson v. Brown holds
that a rent charge reserved out of a lease in fee is partitionable.
1. Seattle Taxicab Co. v. De Jarlais (1925) 236 Pac. 785 (Wash.).
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esting problem in the joinder of independent tortfeasors as defendants in a suit for an injunction to prevent unfair competition.
According to the allegations of the complainant, the plaintiff had
for some years used a distinctive 'yellow cab' in its taxi services, and
had acquired a large and valuable patronage as the result of reliable
and efficient service and reasonable, uniform rates. The three
defendants, who were separate and independent competitors of the
plaintiff in the taxi business, had recently painted their respective
cabs yellow so as to resemble the plaintiff's cabs, whereby the public
was deceived and patronage unfairly diverted from the plaintiff.
No combination or conspiracy was alleged. The prayer was for an
injunctioning and damages. Pending a demurrer for misjoinder of
defendants, the complaint was amended by striking out the prayer
for damages, and thereupon the demurrer was overruled. On appeal
this ruling was affirmed. The decision was not based on any provision of the Washington code, but was made in spite of a section
to the effect that where several causes of action are united in the
same complaint they must affect all of the parties to the action.
The court based its decision on the following passage from
30 "Cyc!' p 129:
"The distinction is marked in the difference between an action for
an injunction and an action for pecuniary damages where both actions
turn upon an injury arising out of the acts of different defendants
between whom there has been no common design or concert of action,
but whose independent acts have in fact united as their common result,
in an invasion of the plaintiff's rights. When plaintiff seeks an injunction against the continuance of this common result, he may join all the
defendants in one action. But when he sues to recover his damages
because of his injury from these separate and independent wrongdoers,
he cannot join them as defendants in one action."
On this basis the case is difficult to sustain. The general equity
rule is the same as at law, namely, that normally separate and independent rights of action against different persons must be enforced
by separate suits.
Judge Story gives the following illustration of the rule :2
"If an estate should be sold in lots to different persons, the purchasers could not join in exhibiting one bill against the vendor for
specific performance; fot each party's case would be distinct, and would
depend upon its own peculiar circumstance.

.

.

. On the other hand,

the vendor in the like case, would not be allowed to file one bill for
specific performance against all the purchasers of the estate, for the
same reason."
The same general rule is equally applicable to suits to enjoin
the commission of torts.
Thus it has been held that separate property owners cannot
join in a bill to restrain separate trespasses to their respective lands
by the same defendant."
2. Story "Eq. PI." (9th ed.) sec. 272.

3. Marselis v. Morris Cancd Co. (N.J. 1830) 1 Sax. 30.
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Nor can separate property owners join in a bill to set aside
their separate conveyances alleged to have been obtained by similar
fraudulent representations. 4 There is, of course, a well-recognized
exception to this rule, which permits separate property owners to
join in a bill to abate, or prevent the continuance of a nuisance which
similarly affects their respective lands.5
The courts usually refer to these cases as involving a 'common' injury to all, as if that afforded a sufficient explanation. The
real reason for permitting the joinder would seem to be the practical convenience of settling the question of nuisance once and for
all in one suit, instead of separately in separate suits by each property owner. So separate judgment creditors may unite in a bill
to reach property which has been fraudulently conveyed.,
The usual statement that the creditors have a common interest
is neither enlightening nor satisfactory. Their interests are obviously
separate and distinct, and not infrequently antagonistic, especially in
those jurisdictions where the diligent creditor may obtain an advantage by prompt action.
But the practical advantage of settling the important question
as to the validity of the conveyance once and for all outweighs the
possible complications.
The same considerations explain the permitted joinder of property owners in bills to prevent illegal assessments. 7 In the case
of defendants, it has never been supposed that a plaintiff could
maintain a bill against independent wrongdoers merely because they
were committing more or less similar wrongs. Thus it has been
held that a bill against separate infringers of a patent or copyright
was multifarious." For the same reason a plaintiff was unable to
maintain a joint bill against separate mine owners who were depositing refuse from their separate mines in separate places so
that such refuse was washed down and deposited on his land.9
The same court held a bill multifarious which sought to restrain several defendants from maintaining separate structures,
each of which obstructed navigation.10
For the same reason it was held a misjoinder for a debtor to
attempt by a single bill to restrain his separate creditors from enforcing separate assignments given to secure their respective claims,
4. Jeffers v. Forbes (1882) 28 Kan. 174; Levering v. Schell (1883)
78 Mo. 167; Norian v. Bennett (1919) 179 Cal. 806.
5. Murray v. Hay (1845) 1 Barb. Ch. 159; Rowbotham v. Robbins
(1890) 47 N. J. Eq. 337; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. (1900) 164 N. Y. 303;
Younkiin v. Milwaukee Trac. Co. (1901) 112 Wis. 15.
6. Brinkerhoff v. Brom (1822) 6 John. Ch. 139; Gates v. Boomer

(1863) 17 Wis. 470.
7. Gage v. Chapman (1870) 56 Ill. 311.

8. Dilly v. Doig (1794) 2 Vesey Jr. 486.
9. Keyes v. Little York Gold Co. (1879) 53 Cal. 724. It has sometimes

been thought that this case is in conflict with the stream pollution cases, but
there is a substantial difference because the pollution cases involve the condition of the stream, and closely resemble the nuisance cases.
10. People v. Oakland (1897) 118 Cal. 234.
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on the ground that such claims were usurious." The reason and
the good sense of the general rule are obvious. Where there is
neither concert nor co-operation between A and B, neither is responsible for the acts of the other, nor concerned with the liability of
the other.
Where every question is separate and distinct, nothing is gained
from an attempt to force a pooling of issues when there are no
common issues or questions to pool.
"Courts of equity, in cases of this sort, are anxious to preserve
some analogy to the comparative simplicity of proceedings at the comconfusion in their own pleadings, as well
mon law, and thus to prevent
12
as in their own decrees."'
To the general rule prohibiting the joinder of independent
wrongdoers as defendants, there are two or three fairly well defined
exceptions. First, there is a class of cases where there is no combination or concert in intent and the acts are separate and distinct.
But there is a combination in result because the result of the acts
of one is affected by the acts of the other. This may be illustrated
by a case 13 where a plaintiff was permitted to maintain a bill against
two defendants who were obstructing access to his property by
parking their respective vehicles in front of it. The most serious
part of the obstruction resulted because both sets of vehicles were
there at the same time. There was co-operation in fact, though
not in intent. A similar situation was involved in the famous merrygo-round case, 14 where intolerable conditions were produced by a
hand organ, a merry-go-round, and some other noisy attractions,
all operated independently at the same time. Any one by itself
might not have been serious, but the combination was unbearable.
That doctrine was carried to the extreme limit in a fairly recent
case 5 in Illinois, where a bill was sustained against the proprietors
of three independent disorderly resorts operated in the same part
of a town, and where a substantial part of the disturbance arose
from the circulation of drunken patrons from one to the other.
Such cases bear a strong analogy to a class of cases where a
joint liability arises at law from independent but concurrent acts
of negligence. For example, where a third person is injured as
the result of a collision between two vehicles, each of which was
negligently operated. The main reason, however, for permitting
a joinder in equity in such cases is the practical advantage of being
able to consider the result as an entirety with all persons responsible for it before the court at once.
The principal case does not seem to fall into this group. The
loss of patronage from the imitation of plaintiff's cabs by A was
not in the least affected by similar misconduct by B.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Atlanta Finance Co. v. Fuiweiler (Ga. 1924) 124 S. E. 689.
Story "Eq. P1." (9th ed.) sec. 271.
Thorpe v. Brumfitt (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 650.
Lam bton. v. IMellisk (1894) 3 Ch. 163.
Bucks v. Strawn (1913) 182 Ill.
App. 644.
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Another very well known group which stand on much the
same basis are the stream pollution cases. It is well settled that
a riparian owner may maintain a bill against any number of persons whose independent acts have contributed to the condition of
the stream.16 The actual condition of the stream, and what caused
it, are questions that would be involved in suits against each of
the defendants, and may as well be settled once and for all. The
last group consists of the water diversion cases. Joinder here has
frequently been sustained.' 7
Such cases involve questions of relative rights, because the
plaintiff is not entitled to all the water in the stream. Upper
riparian proprietors are entitled to some of the water.
Where relative rights must be taken into account, it is desirable
to have all the parties before the court, notwithstanding the added
complication. These cases furnish no analogy for the joinder of
the defendants in the principal case, under any doctrine of contributing to the result.
A joinder might possibly have been sustained, however, on a
different ground. Whether the plaintiff had acquired a right to
the exclusive use of a combination of yellow and black to distinguish its cabs was a contested question involving both law and fact.
That question would be involved in separate suits against the several defendants. The balance of convenience in settling that question might well support. the joinder. In an early English case a
bill was sustained against independent trespassers all of whom
were disputing the plaintiff's alleged prescriptive right of exclusive
fishery.1' On the first argument, the chancellor was of the opinion
that the bill was multifarious because the defendants were not
alleged to be acting in concert.
On reargument he overruled the demurrer and sustained the
bill because the question involved was whether the plaintiff had a
general right to the sole fishery.
A curious combination was presented in a Wisconsin case.19
Plaintiffs, riparian owners on a lake, claimed a prescriptive right
to have the water remain at its accustomed level. One defendant
was maintaining a dam at the inlet to the lake which prevented the
inflow of water, and the other defendant was withdrawing a large
amount of water at the outlet for power purposes. The joinder of
the defendants was sustained, partly on the ground that they contributed to the result complained of, and partly on the ground that
they were both interested in the question of plaintiff's alleged right
to a certain water level. On the latter ground, the case seems
sound and would support the joinder in the principal case.
E. W. HIN-roN.
16.
(1906)
17.
18.
19.

Lockwood v. Lawrence (1885) -77 Me. 297; Warren v. Parkhurst
186 N. Y. 45; State v. Dearing (1912) 244 Mo. 25.
Hillnan v. Newington (1880) 57 Cal. 56.
Mayor of York v. Pilkington (1737) 1 Ak. 282.
Draper v. Brown (1902) 115 Wis. 361.

